This paper considers two canonical Bayesian mechanism design settings. In the single-item setting, the tight approximation ratio of Anonymous Pricing is obtained: (1) compared to Myerson Auction, Anonymous Pricing always generates at least a 1 2.62 -fraction of the revenue; (2) there is a matching lower-bound instance.
INTRODUCTION
Consider two typical revenue-maximization scenarios: (i) a seller has n ∈ N ≥1 items for selling to a unit-demand buyer; and (ii) a seller has a single item for selling to n ∈ N ≥1 potential buyers. In the both scenarios, the seller only knows the buyers' value distributions F = {F i } n i=1 for the item(s) instead of their exact values, and wants to maximize his expected revenue.
The simplest mechanisms are to sell the item(s) at a fixed price. In scenario (i), the seller can choose a uniform price for all items, and then allows the unit-demand buyer to purchase his favorite item (as long as the value of this item is at least the price). In scenario (ii), the seller can select an anonymous price for the item; the first coming buyer (in any order), whose value for the item is at least the price, will take the item.
In practice, the both simple pricing schemes are widely used. In terms of revenue, however, they may not be optimal. In scenario (i), the seller can increase his expected revenue by posting item-wise prices, i.e., the Item Pricing mechanisms in the literature [e.g., see 9, 10, [13] [14] [15] 17] , which include all deterministic mechanisms 1 . In scenario (ii), the seller can even organize an auction, and thus gains more revenue by leveraging the buyer competition. Among these auction schemes, the remarkable Myerson Auction gives the best revenue [see 33] .
Compared to the optimal yet complicated mechanisms, how much revenues can the simple and practical pricing schemes guarantee? This is a central question in the theory of Bayesian mechanism design, or more precisely, the "simple versus optimal" research program. E.g., as we quote from the survey of Lucier [31] : "an interesting question is how well one can approximate the optimal revenue using an anonymous price, rather than personalized prices."
For both of Anonymous Pricing and Uniform Pricing, we settle their approximability in this work. Theorem 1 (Myerson Auction vs. Anonymous Pricing). To sell a single item to multiple buyers with independent regular distributions, the supremum ratio of the Myerson Auction revenue to the Anonymous Pricing revenue equals to the constant
Theorem 2 (Item Pricing vs. Uniform Pricing). To sell multiple items to a unit-demand buyer with independent regular distributions, the supremum ratio of the Item Pricing revenue to the Uniform Pricing revenue equals to the constant C * ≈ 2.6202.
Notably, the imposed regularity assumption (see Section 2 for its definition) of distributions is very standard in microeconomics, and was used in a large volume of previous work. When we allow arbitrarily weird distributions, the both supremum ratios increases to n [see 3, Section 5] . Because those weird distributions are uncommon in practice, the bound of n might not be that informative.
The main body of this work is devoted to establishing the upperbound part of Theorem 1. For the lower-bound part, Jin et al. [30, Appendix A.4 ] gave a matching instance.
Chawla et al. [13, 14, 15] proposed the single-dimensional representative method 2 , bridging scenarios (i) and (ii). As a result, Theorem 1 implies the upper-bound part of Theorem 2. In addition, after reinterpretation and fine-tuning, the lower-bound instance of Theorem 1 also applies to Theorem 2. (All discussions about Theorem 2 will be presented in the full version of this work.) To the best of our knowledge, Theorem 2 gives the first tight constant approximation ratio in any multi-dimensional setting.
As another implication of Theorem 1, the approximation ratio of Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve [e.g., see 2, 12, 29, 30, 32] against Myerson Auction is improved to C * ≈ 2.62. This comparison is a main open problem asked by Hartline and Roughgarden [29] , who proved that the tight ratio is between 2 and 4. This range later shrank to 2.15, 2.72 due to Alaei et al. [3] and Jin et al. [30] . Whether our upper bound of C * ≈ 2.62 is tight is unknown.
Our Technique
To prove Theorem 1, like [3, 30] , we interpret the ratio as the objective function of a math program, and then manually solve the optimal solution. The variables of this math program are an instance F of the mechanism design problem, i.e., n ∈ N ≥1 regular distributions {F i } n i=1 and the number of n itself. Given such a regular instance F: the objective function is the Myerson Auction revenue; the constraint is that the optimal Anonymous Pricing revenue is at most 1.
Formulation. Regarded as functions of the regular instance, the Anonymous Pricing revenue is easy to formulate, whereas the Myerson Auction revenue is quite complex. Given this, Alaei et al. [3] replaced Myerson Auction with Ex-Ante Relaxation (see [14] ), i.e., a "handy" and relaxed objective function. However, the consequent ratio of e ≈ 2.72 is no longer tight for the Myerson Auction vs. Anonymous Pricing problem.
Conceivably, investigating Myerson Auction itself is necessary for acquiring the exact revenue formula. For this, the main obstacle is that Myerson Auction is clarified based on the virtual values [33] . We introduce the virtual value CDF in Section 2, resulting in the desired revenue formula.
We need three different representations of a distribution: (1) the CDF F i is used to formulate the Anonymous Pricing revenue, (2) the virtual value CDF D i is used to formulate the Myerson Auction revenue, and (3) the revenue-quantile curve r i is more convenient to decide whether a distribution is regular. In different parts of the proof, we will choose the most suitable representation. This incurs another task -how to bridge these representations. Actually, we observe several one-to-one identities among these representations, which may be of independent interest (cf. the similar structural result in [20, Lemma 5] ) and find their applications in the future.
Similar to [3, 30] , the proof in this work can be organized into the Reduction Part and the Optimization Part.
Reduction Part. To solve the Ex-Ante Relaxation vs. Anonymous Pricing problem, Alaei et al. [3] first showed that the worst case is reached by the triangular distributions, i.e., a subset of regular distributions. A regular distribution has a concave-shape revenue-quantile curve. By contrast, a triangular distribution has a triangle-shape revenue-quantile curve, which lies on the boundary of the concave curve family. I.e., a triangular distribution is on the boundary of the regular distribution family. Notably, describing a triangular distribution requires merely two parameters. Thus, the reduction to the triangular distributions greatly simplifies the math program in [3] .
Actually, given any regular instance F = {F i } n i=1 , the Ex-Ante Relaxation revenue only depends on a specific set of value-probability
. Among all regular instances with the same value-probability pairs, there exists a certain instance being stochastically dominated by the others and thus giving the smallest Anonymous Pricing revenue (for any posted price p ∈ R ≥0 ). This special instance is exactly a triangular instance.
In comparison, the Myerson Auction revenue depends on the whole instance F = {F i } n i=1 rather than any set of value-probability pairs. Hence, the mentioned reduction seems inapplicable to the math program in this work. We instead adopt several more complicated reductions, thus to some extent characterizing the worst-case instance of our math program.
More concretely, we observe that a (worst-case) revenue-quantile curve r i is a triangle or quadrangle with a curved edge. Since such a revenue-quantile curve r i is a concave function (as the distribution F i is regular), the curved edge is upper-bounded by each tangent line of it; thus, the distribution that corresponds to this tangent line stochastically dominates distribution F i . Also, the curved edge is lower-bounded by the line connecting its two ends, which corresponds to another distribution that is stochastically dominated by distribution F i . Each of our reductions never decreases the Myerson Auction revenue. Moreover, with the help of the two auxiliary distributions, we also prove that, after each reduction, the optimal Anonymous Pricing revenue is at most 1. I.e., the feasibility of the instance is always guaranteed.
To the best of our knowledge, no reductions tailored specifically to asymmetric regular distributions are previously known. Because many other single-dimensional or multi-dimensional mechanisms in the literature are built on Anonymous Pricing, the techniques in the Reduction Part might enlighten the future work on proving tight or tighter approximation ratios of these mechanisms.
Optimization Part. For each math program in [3, 30] and this work, the worst-case instance falls in the family of what we call continuous instances. A continuous instance is comprised of infinite buyers, each of which has an infinitesimal buying-probability. Conceivably, the Myerson Auction revenue or the Ex-Ante Relaxation revenue from a continuous instance is captured by an integral. In addition, we will see that the ratio C * ≈ 2.62 is exactly the best Myerson Auction revenue achievable by any continuous instance. To settle Theorem 1, it suffices to prove that any feasible instance of our math program can be transformed into another continuous instance, without hurting the Myerson Auction revenue. Such idea was also employed in [3] to obtain the tight ratio of e ≈ 2.72 for the Ex-Ante Relaxation vs. Anonymous Pricing problem.
As mentioned, the first step in [3] is a reduction from any regular instance to another triangular instance. Actually, any set of triangular distributions intrinsically admits a total order. Also, because of the special structure of Ex-Ante Relaxation, these triangular distributions can be transformed (into a target continuous instance) one by one in the total order. This fact greatly simplifies the proof in [3] .
However, a set of regular distributions in general does not admit the mentioned total order. For this reason, in this work: (locally) each distribution has to be transformed piece by piece; (globally) all distributions have to be transformed simultaneously. Besides, Myerson Auction has a more complicated structure than Ex-Ante Relaxation. These issues together incur many technical challenges to implementing the transformation and verifying that the Myerson Auction revenue never decreases.
To enable the proof, potential function comes to the rescue: we find a natural potential to indicate the status of an instance. (In some sense, this potential function is a new representation of a distribution.) Given this, we can implement the transformation as an iterative algorithm, during which the potential declines by a fixed amount per iteration. After sufficiently many iterations, the potential ultimately declines to zero, and a desired continuous instance is achieved.
Such transformation is applicable to any instance whose optimal Anonymous Pricing revenue is at most (1 − ε), i.e., any instance locating in the interior of the feasible space of our math program. For any instance locating on the boundary of the feasible space, we still need to convert it into another "interior" instance. This modification may incur a revenue loss of Myerson Auction. However, once the modification is small enough (under some measurement), the revenue loss can be arbitrarily small, which is sufficient to establish Theorem 1.
Even though the ideas of modifying the input instance are widely used in other subareas within TCS (e.g., the smoothed analysis literature), this is the first time that they are used to prove approximation ratio of simple mechanism. In return, the techniques involved in the Optimization Part may even be of interest to the optimization community and the approximation algorithms community.
Further Related Work
Both of Anonymous Pricing and Uniform Pricing are widely studied in the literature [3, 7-9, 22-24, 28, 30] . In the single-item setting, another important family of pricing schemes is Sequential Posted-Pricing [1, 4, 19, 25, 30, 31] . Such a mechanism allows buyer-wise pricing strategies, and therefore dominates Anonymous Pricing in revenue. Under the regularity assumption, the tight ratio of Sequential Posted-Pricing to Anonymous Pricing also equals to C * ≈ 2.62 [30] .
In the single-buyer unit-demand setting, the family of Item Pricing mechanisms includes all deterministic mechanisms, among which finding the optimum is NP-hard [17] . If randomness is allowed, the seller can gain more revenue by employing lottery [10, 15, 16, 27] . Chen et al. [16] settled the complexities of finding and describing the optimal randomized mechanism.
Other more general multi-item settings involve single or multiple buyers with unit-demand or other utility functions, in which optimal mechanisms can be much more complex. For this reason, the last two decades have seen a great deal of work on proving the intractability of optimal mechanisms, and an richer literature on proving that simple mechanisms approximate optimal mechanisms by constant factors. In this amount of space, evaluating so extensive a literature is impossible. As a guideline, the reader can refer to the hardness results in [5, 16-18, 21, 26, 34] , the approximation results in [6, 9-11, 13-15, 35] , and the references therein.
NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
Below, we formally define in the mathematical notions to be used in the paper.
• Function (·) + maps any real number z ∈ R to max{0, z}.
• Function 1{·} denotes the indicator function.
respectively denote the left and the right limitations (if exist) of a function д in the neighborhood of w = z.
respectively denote the left derivative and the right derivative (if exist) of a function д at w = z. • For any increasing function д (may not be strictly increasing),
Similarly, for any decreasing function д, define its inverse
Probability Distribution. We use three mathematically equivalent representations to describe a regular distribution: cumulative distribution function, revenue-quantile curve, and virtual value cumulative distribution function. Actually, the first and the second representations (to be introduced in Section 2.1) are applicable to more general distributions.
Cumulative Distribution Function and Revenue-Quantile Curve
The most natural way to describe a distribution is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) F i , which is assumed to be a leftcontinuous function for convenience. I.e., let b i be a random variable drawn from this distribution, then
When there is no ambiguity, we also denote by F i the distribution. Fact 1. For any distribution, its CDF F i and revenue-quantile curve r i admit the reductions below:
Extra Notation. We now define several useful quantities based on the CDF F i :
. When there are multiple alternative monopoly prices, we break ties by choosing the largest one.
Alternatively, we can defined these quantities based on the revenuequantile curve r i as well:
• The support-supremum
. When there are multiple alternative monopoly quantiles, we break ties by choosing the smallest one.
Note that v i ≤ u i and possibly v i = u i = ∞. To comprehend these notions intuitively, consider this pricing scenario: a seller wants to sell a single item by posting a price of p ∈ R ≥0 ; a single buyer draws his value of b i ∈ R ≥0 from a distribution F i , and takes the item iff his value is at least the posted price of p i . Clearly, the value of b i is capped to the support-supremum u i . Also, the seller can maximize his expected revenue by posting the monopoly price p = v i , resulting in a selling probability (i.e., the quantile) of the monopoly quantile q i .
Regular Distribution and Virtual Value
We denote by Reg the set of regular distributions. It is well known [e.g., see 33] that there are several equivalent ways to describe such a distribution. Among these equivalent definitions, we will choose the most convenient one in different parts of this work. Definition 1 (Regular Distribution). The following conditions for the regularity are equivalent.
(1) The virtual value CDF D i is well defined, and has a finite expectation
the probability density function (PDF).
Together with a positive constant r i (0) ≥ − ∫ R z · dD i (z) + , we can reconstruct the CDF F i and the revenue-quantile curve r i from the virtual value CDF D i and vice versa. Fact 2. For any regular distribution F i ∈ Reg, its virtual value CDF D i (well defined) and revenue-quantile curve r i (continuous and concave) admit the reductions below:
Fact 3. For any regular distribution F i ∈ Reg, its virtual value CDF D i (well defined) and CDF F i (with an increasing virtual value function φ i ) admit the reductions below:
By the above discussions, we can infer the next Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. For any regular distribution F i ∈ Reg, the following holds.
(1) In interval q ∈ [0, 1], the revenue-quantile curve r i is left-and right-differentiable everywhere. At any quantile q ∈ [0, 1], the left derivative equals to the corresponding virtual value, i.e.,
the distribution F i may have a probability mass; the CDF F i is left-and right-differentiable anywhere else. W.l.o.g., the PDF f i exists and is left-continuous.
(3) The CDF stochastically dominates the virtual value CDF, i.e.,
As the next Figure 2 shows, the quantities defined before also have geometric meanings w.r.t. the virtual value CDF:
• The support-supremum u i = max supp(D i ) = φ i (u + i ) when the constant r i (0) = 0 and u i = ∞ when the constant Triangular Distribution. This family of distributions [denoted by Tri; introduced by 3] is a subset of the regular distribution family Reg. Such a distribution has the same support-supremum and monopoly price u i = v i ∈ R ≥0 . Given the monopoly quantile q i ∈ [0, 1], a triangular distribution Tri(v i , q i ) can be represented as follows. As Figure 3 
Myerson Auction and Anonymous Pricing
In the single-item Bayesian mechanism design setting, a seller wants to sell an indivisible item to n ∈ N ≥1 potential buyers. The buyers independently draw their values
Myerson Auction. For any regular 3 instance F = {F i } n i=1 ∈ Reg n , upon receiving the values {b i } n i=1 from the buyers, the seller performs Myerson Auction as follows:
is understood) the Myerson Auction revenue, which is formulated as Fact 4 in the below.
Fact 4 (Myerson Auction Revenue Formula). For any regular
Anonymous Pricing. In such a mechanism, the seller posts a price of p ∈ R ≥0 to the item. The item is sold out iff at least one buyer i ∈ [n] has a value of b i ≥ p. Obviously, the selling probability
Again, we write AP(p) instead of AP(p, F) when the instance F = {F i } n i=1 is understood. The seller will choose an optimal posted price, hence a revenue of AP def = max p ∈R ≥0 AP(p) .
The Myerson Auction vs. Anonymous Pricing problem can be formulated the following Program (P0). Notice that constraint (C0) trivially holds when p ∈ (0, 1).
PROOF OVERVIEW
The proof of Theorem 1 is enabled by finding the worst-case instance of Program (P0). We will outline the approach in this section (with more details postponed to the full version of this work), which can be divided into the following two parts.
Reduction Part. In Sections 3.1 to 3.3, we will present several reductions among the feasible instances of Program (P0), with the purpose of characterizing the worst case. As a result, the optimal objective value of Program (P0) is upper-bounded by that of the following Program (P1).
Optimization Part. We will define a special feasible instance of Program (P1) in Section 3.4, and then prove that this instance is actually a worst-case instance (see Sections 3.5 to 3.7). To convey the main ideas behind the proof, a "proof plan" is provided at the end of Section 3.4.
A Special Buyer Tri(1, 1)
Given any feasible instance F = {F i } n i=1 of Program (P0), we investigate the composition of it with the special triangular distribution Tri(1, 1). By definition (see Section 2.1), the triangular distribution Tri(1, 1) has the same CDF and virtual value CDF
First, the composition instance is feasible to Program (P0) as well. I.e., for any posted price of p ∈ [1, ∞], since F 0 (p) = 1, the composition instance gives the same Anonymous Pricing revenue as the given instance F. Second, compared to the given instance F, the composition instance Tri(1, 1) ∪ F gives a higher Myerson Auction revenue. In that D 0 (p) = 1{p > 1},
This modified objective function indicates that any other buyer now contributes to the Myerson Auction revenue only when his virtual value is higher than 1. This observation enables the next Main Lemma 1. To establish this main lemma, we employ the ideas involved in [3, Lemma 3.1].
Main Lemma 1. For any worst-case instance {Tri(1, 1)} ∪ F of Program (P0), w.l.o.g. the following holds for each i ∈ [n]:
(2) If the monopoly quantile q i > 0, then ∂ − r i (q) > 1 for all q ∈ [0, q i ].
We transform Program (P0) into the next Program (P0 ′ ). Clearly, constraint (C1 ′ ) is due to Main Lemma 1. 
where the first inequality is due to constraint (C0 ′ ). For ease of notation, we never explicitly mention the special triangular distribution Tri(1, 1) elsewhere.
A Special Buyer Tri(∞)
We further analyze the worst-case instance of Program (P0 ′ ), resulting in the next Main Lemma 2.
Main Lemma 2 (A Special Buyer Tri(∞)). For any worst-case instance F = {F i } n i=0 of Program (P0 ′ ), w.l.o.g. the following holds:
Based on Main Lemma 2, we can transform Program (P0 ′ ) into the next Program (P0 ′′ ). Concretely, objective (P0 ′′ ) is due to objective (P0 ′ ), by taking into account Main Lemma 2 as (in a worst case) n i=0 r i (0) = 1 + n i=1 r i (0) = 1. Besides, constraint (C2 ′′ ) is due to constraint (C2 ′ ) and Main Lemma 2.2. For simplicity, we never explicitly mention the special distribution Tri(∞) elsewhere.
A Simple Relaxation
Comparing Program (P0 ′′ ) to the desired Program (P1), we notice that only constraint (C0 ′′ ) differs from constraint (C1). To complete the transformation, we rearrange constraint (C0 ′′ ), hence another mathematically equivalent constraint (C0 ′′′ ).
Clearly, constraint (C1) can be derived from constraint (C0 ′′′ ) via a standard trick [e.g., see 3, Lemma 3.4], i.e., ln(1+z) ≥ p −1 ·ln(1+p ·z) when p > 1 and z ≥ 0. This accomplishes the Reduction Part of Section 3. To see Theorem 1, it suffices to prove that the optimal objective value of Program (P1) is upper-bounded by the constant C * ≈ 2.62.
Continuous Instance
In the reminder of Section 3 (i.e., the Optimization Part), we will grasp a specific worst-case instance of Program (P1). This instance lies in the family of what we call continuous instances. 
Then, the continuous instance Cont(γ ) is defined as the limitation instance lim
and the continuous instance Cont(γ ) are feasible to Program (P1).
Recall function Q(p)
involved in Theorem 1. In the next Fact 5, we get a Myerson Auction revenue formula tailored specifically to continuous instances. The subsequent Figure 4 is offered for demonstration. The reader may wonder how to get Fact 5 from Definition 2: the revenue formula involves function Q, whereas a continuous instance Cont(γ ) is defined based on function R. Actually, there is a differential equation bridging the both functions and thus enabling Fact 5. (We defer such technical details to the full version.) It is noteworthy that, among all continuous instances, Cont(1) gives the best Myerson Auction revenue, i.e.,
Proof Plan and Organization. In Sections 3.5 to 3.7, we will prove that the special continuous instance Cont(1) is a worst-case instance of Program (P1). To this end, we will covert any feasible instance F = {F i } n i=1 of Program (P1) to a targeted continuous instance Cont(γ * ), without hurting the Myerson Auction revenue. More concretely:
• We construct a finite-length LIST of instances, beginning with the discrete instance F (also denoted by GIVEN), and ending up with the targeted continuous instance Cont(γ * ) (also denoted by TAIL). In the interior of the LIST, any other instance is composed of a discrete component and a continuous component. • Consider a pair of consecutive instances PREV and NEXT in the LIST. The instance NEXT is constructed from the instance PREV in a consistent pattern: we always "diminish" the discrete component and "augment" the continuous component. • The construction of the whole LIST will be implemented as an iterative algorithm.
The remainder of Section 3 is organized as follows:
• In Section 3.5, we first clarify how to construct a single distribution in each iteration, and then prove that this construction preserves the feasibility to constraints (C2) and (C3). • In Section 3.6, we will elaborate on the construction in each iteration (i.e., how to obtain an instance NEXT from an instance PREV), and afterward validate the feasibility to constraints (C1) under this construction. • In Section 3.7, we will implement the iterative algorithm based on the proposed constructions, showing that the targeted continuous instance TAIL = Cont(γ * ) brings a higher Myerson Auction revenue than the discrete instance F = GIVEN. As mentioned in Section 3.4, among all continuous instances, Cont(1) gives the best Myerson Auction revenue of the constant C * ≈ 2.62. Combining everything together accomplishes the proof of Theorem 1.
Construction of a New Distribution F k
To describe our construction of a new distribution F k from a given feasible distribution F k of Program (P1), we need the following requisite notions about potential.
Definition 3 (Potential of a Distribution). For any regular distribution F k ∈ Reg:
• Define the potential function Ψ k (p)
It is noteworthy that the potential function Ψ k (p) is exactly the k-th summand on the LHS of constraint (C1). Clearly, this function records all details about distribution F k , thus serving as a new representation of distribution F k . In the next Fact 6, we study the monotonicity of the potential function Ψ k (p), which is useful for our later proofs. Fact 6 (Potential of a Distribution). For any feasible distribution F k of Program (P1):
(3) Ψ k (p) = 0 when p ∈ (u k , ∞).
3.5.1
The Potential-Based Construction DIMINISH. Given any distribution F k feasible to Program (P1), our construction of a new distribution F k is controlled by a pointwise potential-decrease of ∆ k ∈ [0, Ψ k ]. As the following Figure 5 shows, let Ψ k (p)
denote the new potential function,
where function (·) + maps a real number z ∈ R to max{z, 0}. The potential-decrease ∆ k is capped to the gross potential
We call the construction "DIMINISH the given distribution F k by a factor of ∆ k " or simply F k ← DIMINISH(F k , ∆ k ) . We now review several notions tailored specifically to the new distribution F k .
• The monopoly price v k = v k , which can be inferred from Fact 6 and Figure 5 . To emphasize that the monopoly price is invariant, we mark it with an asterisk * . • The monopoly quantile q k ≤ q k . By construction, we have Later, we will prove that the new distribution F k is regular (see Main Lemma 3 in Section 3.5.2), which implies the following:
is an increasing function on interval p ∈ R ≥0 . • The revenue-quantile curve r k is a concave function on interval q ∈ [0, 1]. By construction, we also have r k (q) ≤ r k (q) for all q ∈ [0, 1]. • The virtual value CDF D k is well defined.
3.5.2
Properties of the Construction DIMINISH. In this part, we present several properties of the construction DIMINISH, which are cornerstones of our later proofs. First, as Figure 5(b) shows, Fact 6 also holds for the new distribution F k : Figure 5 : Demonstration for the construction of F k .
is a decreasing function on interval p ∈ [v * k , u k ].
(2) Ψ k (p) = Ψ k = ln 1 + v * k q k 1−q k when p ∈ (0, v * k ). (1) The new distribution F k is regular, i.e., F k ∈ Reg.
(2) The virtual value function φ k (p) ≥ φ k (p) for all p ∈ R ≥0 . (C2) and (C3). We next justify the feasibility to constraints (C2) and (C3) under the construction DIMINISH. For ease of reference, the both constraints are reformulated in the below.
Feasibility Analysis: Constraints
[Constraint (C2)]. As mentioned in Section 3.5.2, the new distri-
for all p ∈ [0, v * i ]. In terms of the revenue-quantile curve (see Section 2.1), we have ln 1 +
Then, elementary calculations indicate that constraint (C2) holds for the new distribution F k .
[Constraint (C3)]. We verify all inequalities involved in constraint (C3) one by one.
(1) As mentioned in Section 3.5.1, the monopoly price v * i is invariant under the construction DIMINISH. Thus, the first inequality v * i > 1 trivially holds. (2) It follows from Main Lemma 3.2 that the monopoly virtual
As mentioned in Section 3.5.1, the monopoly quantile q i ≤ q i .
When q i > 0, the revenue-quantile curve
When q i = 0, the new CDF F i (p) = 1 for all p ∈ R ≥0 , i.e., the new distribution F i is negligible.
(4) As mentioned in Section 3.5.1, r i (q) ≤ r i (q) for all q ∈ [0, 1], hence the last inequality.
For simplicity, we never explicitly mention constraints (C2) and (C3) hereafter.
Construction of a New Instance F ∪ Cont(γ )
To clarify the construction of a new instance (which is built on the construction DIMINISH), we shall generalize the notions about potential from a distribution to an instance:
Definition 4 (Potential of an Instance). For any regular
As an implication of Fact 6, the next Fact 7 is tailored to the feasible instances of Program (P1). (
1−q i is the gross potential of the given instance F. More concretely:
• We partition the potential-decrease of ∆ into sub-potentialdecreases {∆ i } n i=1 . Recall Fact 7.1 that the potential function
for each i ∈ [n]. Hence, (i) each sub-potential-decrease ∆ i is capped to the gross potential Ψ i = ln 1 + v i q i 1−q i of that distribution F i ; and (ii) the potential-decrease of ∆ entirely gets allocated.
• With the sub-potential-decreases {∆ i } n i=1 , we obtain the new instance F via (for all k ∈ [n]) the sub-constructions F k ← DIMINISH(F k , ∆ k ) . The parameter U is exactly the support-supremum of the new instance F. Formally, the partition scheme {∆ i } n i=1 and the construction are implemented as Algorithm 1 (which is also named after "DIMINISH" for simplicity) in the below. To make things mimic, we offer the subsequent Figure 6 for demonstration.
1: Define the new support-supremum U ← Ψ −1 (∆) 2: for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n do 3:
(a) The potential functions Ψ 1 (p) and Ψ 2 (p)
The potential functions Ψ 1 (p) and Ψ 2 (p) Figure 6 : Demonstration for the construction DIMINISH.
Recall Main Lemma 3.2: under the construction DIMINISH, the virtual value function φ i (of each new distribution F i ) maps any value p ∈ R ≥0 to a higher virtual value than the virtual value function φ i (of each given distribution F i ).
Conceivably, higher virtual values shall lead to a higher Myerson Auction revenue. However, the construction DIMINISH makes each new distribution F i stochastically dominated by the given distribution F i , which incurs a revenue loss of Myerson Auction. To deal with this issue, the key idea is to add a continuous instance (see Definition 2) as compensation. In the subsequent Section 3.6.2, we will explain how to construct this continuous instance. 
and function R(p) = −p · ln(1 −p −2 ). Notably, for any composition instance F ∪ Cont(γ ), the potential function Ψ(p) only refers to the discrete component F = {F i } n i=1 . Moreover, we slightly modify the LHS of constraint (C1) by taking into account the continuous component Cont(γ ).
On the one hand, the construction F k ← DIMINISH(F k , ∆ k ) slackens constraint (C1) by a factor of ∆. On the other hand, the construction Cont(γ ) ← AUGMENT Cont(γ ), ∆ tightens constraint (C1) by a factor of ∆. Thus, we can easily infer the feasibility. 
) and by V * def = min i ∈[n] {v * i } > 1 the minimum monopoly price. Suppose that the following holds:
Then, for any potential-decrease 4 ∆ ≤ 1 12 · e − 2 V * −1 · ε * 3 , consider the
Remark 1. Recall Section 3.6.1: to implement the construction F ← DIMINISH(F, ∆) , we first partition the potential-decrease ∆ into sub-potential-decreases {∆ i } n i=1 , and then obtain the new in-
Naturally, the construction in Main Lemma 4 can be implemented as an n-round iterative algorithm: in each k-th round, we invoke the sub-constructions Cont(γ ) ← AUGMENT(Cont(γ ), ∆ k ) and F k ← DIMINISH(F k , ∆ k ) . It is not hard to see that each k-th round preserves Points 2 to 4 (under minor modifications of the statements) in Main Lemma 4.
In fact, the Myerson Auction revenue increases in each k-th round. This task is much easier than proving Point 1 directly: because only the k-th distribution and the continuous component change, we only need to reason about them. After settling this simplified task, we infer Point 1 by induction.
Main Lemma 4 naturally leads to an induction-based proof of Theorem 1, since Points 3 and 4 respectively preserve Conditions (a) and (b). More concretely, once modifying the given instance F ∪ Cont(∞) so as to achieve the both conditions, we can contruct the targeted continuous instance Cont(γ * ) via an iterative algorithm:
(1) Modify the given instance F ∪ Cont(∞) to achieve Conditions (a) and (b). 4 Also, ∆ is capped to Ψ = n i =1 ln 1 + v * i q i 1−q i , i.e., the gross potential of the discrete component F.
By Main Lemma 4.1 and induction, the Myerson Auction revenue increases during
Step 3 of the iterative algorithm. Thus, to prove Theorem 1, the only issue left is whether the modification in Step 1 incurs a large revenue loss of Myerson Auction. With a small enough constant ε * in Main Lemma 4, we actually find a modification scheme so that the revenue loss is arbitrarily small, which is sufficient to establish Theorem 1:
(1) DIMINISH the given discrete component F by a factor of 2 · ε * . (2) AUGMENT the "fake" continuous component Cont(∞) by a factor of ε * .
Main Lemma 5 (Modification). For any feasible instance F = {F i } n i=1 of Program (P1) and any constant 5 ε * ∈ (0, 1/2), consider the instance F ∪ Cont(γ ) obtained via the constructions γ ← R −1 (ε * ) and F ← DIMINISH(F, 2 · ε * ) :
(2) Ψ(p) + R max{p, γ } ≤ R(p) − ε * for all p ∈ (1, U].
(3) R(γ ) = ε * .
Construction of the Targeted Continuous Instance Cont(γ * )
Based on the former discussions, we now construct the targeted continuous instance Cont(γ * ) from the given instance F = {F i } n i=1 . The whole construction is implemented as Algorithm 2 (named as MAIN), which is composed of two subroutines:
(1) PREPROCESS, i.e., the modification of the given instance based on Main Lemma 5. (2) FOR-LOOP, i.e., the repeat invocation of the construction from Main Lemma 4.
We adopt the following notations in MAIN. Particularly, any quantity marked with an asterisk * is invariant (e.g., each monopoly price v * i > 1, as mentioned in Section 3.5.1).
is the gross potential of the input instance. • ε * < min{1/2, Ψ * /2} is an arbitrarily small constant.
• V * def = min i ∈[n] {v * i } > 1 is the minimum monopoly price. • T * def = 12 ε * 3 · Ψ * · e 2/(V * −1) is the time horizon of FOR-LOOP. • ∆ * def = (Ψ * − 2 · ε * )/T * is the step size of FOR-LOOP. • γ * def = R −1 (Ψ * − 2 · ε * ) ∈ [1, ∞] is well defined.
Finally, we can establish Theorem 1 by applying Algorithm 2 and Main Lemmas 4 and 5. During PREPROCESS (see Step 1), the gross potential of the discrete component decreases from Ψ * to (Ψ * − 2 · ε * ). Since the constant ε * < min{1/2, Ψ * /2}, Main Lemma 5 is applicable, i.e., the revenue loss of Myerson Auction during PREPROCESS is at most 8 · ε * . Now, we can infer Conditions (a) and (b) in Main Lemma 4 respectively from Points 3 and 4 in Main Lemma 5. By definition, T * · ∆ * = Ψ * − 2 ·ε * , i.e., the remaining gross potential of (Ψ * − 2 ·ε * ) 5 Also, ε * is capped to 1 2 · n i =1 ln 1 + v * i q i 1−q i , i.e., half of the gross potential of the given discrete component F. Thus, Main Lemma 4 is applicable to each of the T * iterations, i.e., the Myerson Auction revenue never decreases during FOR-LOOP. By Fact 5, this targeted continuous instance Cont(γ * ) gives a smaller Myerson Auction revenue than the special continuous instance Cont(1), i.e., OPT Cont(γ * ) ≤ OPT Cont(1) = C * ≈ 2.62. Put everything together:
OPT(F * ) − 8 · ε * ≤ OPT Cont(γ * ) ≤ C * ≈ 2.62.
As the constant ε * ∈ (0, 1 2 ) can be arbitrarily small, OPT(F * ) ≤ C * ≈ 2.62 for any feasible instance F * of Program (P1).
